Agile cryptography allows for a resource-efficient swap of a cryptographic core in case the security of an underlying classical cryptographic algorithm becomes compromised. In this paper, we suggest how this principle can be applied to the field of quantum cryptography. We explicitly demonstrate two quantum cryptographic protocols: quantum digital signatures (QDS) and quantum secret sharing (QSS), on the same hardware sender and receiver platform, with protocols only differing in their classical post-processing. The system is also suitable for quantum key distribution (QKD) and is highly compatible with deployed telecommunication infrastructures, since it uses standard quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) encoding and heterodyne detection. For the first time, QDS protocols are modified to allow for postselection at the receiver, enhancing protocol performance. The cryptographic primitives QDS and QSS are inherently multipartite and we prove that they are secure not only when a player internal to the task is dishonest, but also when (external) eavesdropping on the quantum channel is allowed. In the first proof-of-principle demonstration of an agile quantum communication system, the quantum states were distributed at GHz rates. This allows for a one-bit message to be securely signed using our QDS protocols in less than 0.05 ms over a 2 km fiber link and in less than 0.2 s over a 20 km fiber link. To our knowledge, this also marks the first demonstration of a continuous-variable direct QSS protocol. * stefan.richter@mpl.mpg.de, mt45@st-andrews.ac.uk; These authors contributed equally to this work. communication hardware may support a diverse range of quantum communication protocols on it. This provides an abstraction layer between quantum-enabled hardware and the post-processing stack necessary to realize a quantum communication protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, cryptography has been threatened by advances in mathematics, computational power and side channel attacks, and may soon be threatened by quantum computers. The breaking of a cryptosystem, i.e. a suite of cryptographic algorithms and hardware needed to implement a particular security service, usually triggered the development of new algorithms. These would subsequently be tested and hardened for years before they could finally be deployed into real world applications to secure our ever-growing digital infrastructure. The redeployment of cryptographic soft-and hard-ware is a costly endeavor.
In the past decade, crypto-agility has emerged as a prospective solution to this problem [1] . One of the core ideas of crypto-agility is to provide a middleware with a two-way interface between the software application layer and the crypto-core or algorithm of the cryptosystem, Fig. 1 (a) . Whenever a new attack vector emerges, the deployed architecture may stay in place and only the vulnerable crypto-core is replaced. This saves valuable deployment time as well as costs to re-engineer the whole system. The technical challenge is to design the middleware flexible enough to support novel crypto-cores.
We suggest a concept of quantum crypto-agility for quantum communication. Just like the quantum computer hardware provides qubits and gates to run different quantum algorithms on it, we propose that quantum tum cryptographic protocols may be implemented on the same hardware deployment with alterations only at the level of classical postprocessing.
Our paper is outlined as follows. In Sec. II, we propose and discuss two alternative formulations of quantum crypto-agility, and show that existing trends in the QKD and QDS literature may be interpreted as one such formulation. In Sec. III we discuss three cryptographic tasks, QDS, QSS and QKD, and introduce several secure protocols which rely on the same physical setups. These protocols are implemented in Sec. IV and the resulting key rates and figures of merit are displayed in Sec. V. We believe this demonstrates a crucial proof-of-principle step towards full quantum crypto-agility. Finally, we discuss our achievements through the lens of agility in Sec. VI. Comparison between classical crypto-agility and the proposed agile quantum cryptography architecture. (a) Classical Crypto-Agility: Different classical cryptographic algorithms, such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE), Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), One-time Pad (OTP) or Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) can be flexibly combined on the same hardware platform. A network interface card (NIC) is used to send and receive secure communication. (b) QKD-Assisted Crypto-Agility: Classical cryptographic algorithms make use of a pool of secret keys generated by a QKD crypto core. The quantum functionality is tied to the hardware implementation and cannot easily be upgraded, e.g. to perform quantum digital signatures (QDS) or quantum secret sharing (QSS). (c) Quantum Crypto-Agility: Classical cryptographic algorithms and different quantum protocols can be swapped out and combined as necessary, requiring no changes to the underlying hardware architecture.
Classical crypto-agility is described pictorially in Fig. 1(a) , in which a potentially vulnerable crypto-core may be readily replaced without affecting the rest of the deployed system. The encrypted communication is then sent on the hardware level via a network interface card (NIC). We suggest here two different approaches to consider a quantum cryptosystem as agile.
One can think of a first type of agility as crypto-agility assisted by QKD. Here a QKD system acts as a black box that delivers fresh shared keys to classical cryptography applications, see Fig. 1(b) . The advantage is that the middleware does not have to care about key generation and the QKD protocol itself. The downside is that the QKD system may not be reused to run any other quantum protocol on it, meaning that the agility is confined completely to the classical realm, with the hardware and quantum crypto-core being fixed.
The second approach, quantum crypto-agility, is depicted in Fig. 1(c) . Compared to the first approach, the QKD system is replaced by a quantum network interface card (QNIC). The QNIC is able to perform multiple quantum communication protocols (e.g. QDS, QSS or QKD) on the same hardware platform. It communicates its hardware capabilities through an interface to the protocol layer, where the matching protocol for the user task at hand is chosen. A concrete example for such a layer stack is shown in Fig. 2 . Note that here the choice of a particular quantum cryptographic application is reduced merely to a software and/or firmware update. Such a quantum agile crypto-system carries direct analogy with the classical agile crypto-system of Fig. 1 : hardware and agile interface stay the same and only the crypto-core, classical, as in Fig. 1(a) , or quantum, as in Fig. 1(c) , changes. This second approach to agility can be thought of as a choice of quantum "app".
This approach carries an advantage of economic use of resources. QKD requires resource-intensive postprocessing to generate a secure key, and real channel parameters (e. g., noise, losses) may be too restrictive to allow for efficient secret key distillation. Some tasks, however, can be performed directly without first generating a shared secure key via QKD. A good example are QDS protocols, in which a secure signature is created straight from a raw quantum state exchange, consuming fewer resources than an equivalent QKD protocol [2] .
It is important to realize that the transfer of the crypto-agility idea to the field of quantum cryptography changes its meaning, as the security of the quantum crypto-core can be proven information-theoretically. However, considering practical implementation security and the emergence of novel quantum cryptographic protocols and performance improvements to existing ones, an agile strategy seems prudent.
Quantum crypto-agility may also be a relevant topic for ongoing standardization efforts, such as the ETSI QKD ISG 004 and 014 standards [3, 4] that define the interface between applications and key providers such as a key management system or QKD systems. However, the agility aspect has not been necessarily recognized and highlighted there. Notably, to our knowledge, neither CV nor DV based systems capable of selectively performing several different quantum primitives on the same hardware have been demonstrated so far. In the remainder of this paper we will thus exclusively consider the second type of quantum crypto-agility, Fig. 1 (c), which will be preferable in situations where full QKD is either not possible or not necessary.
III. BEYOND QKD: SIGNATURES AND SECRETS
In addition to the usual bipartite QKD, and in order to make our notion of quantum crypto-agility concrete, we consider the following multipartite tasks:
QDS -quantum digital signatures: allows for the secure authentication of a classical message. It has been shown that because of its small overhead, QDS may run over channels for which QKD is insecure [2] .
QSS -quantum secret sharing: allows for the secure distribution of a classical secret among a conspiracy of potentially dishonest recipients.
In the spirit of quantum crypto-agility introduced earlier, Figs. 1 (c), 2, we explicitly propose two communication systems, i.e. configurations of the same underlying hardware, which can each fulfill multiple quantum cryptographic tasks. The two systems may thus both be considered as agile, and we denote them QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK and QDS-f -QKD-f -CV-QPSK, see Fig. 3 . The labels indicate which cryptographic tasks (QDS, QSS or QKD) they support; the underlying quantum states that they use (a continuous-variable CV-QPSK alphabet); and in which direction (f -"forward" or b -"backward") the quantum states are exchanged. Labeling agile quantum cryptosystems by the hardware components they are based on and the protocols they support might prove useful in later efforts to standardize interfaces and provide some comparability between different implementations.
Note that the use of the QPSK alphabet and heterodyne detection renders our system highly compatible with standard telecom infrastructure, potentially paving a way to integrating quantum agile systems into deployed communication links which run with up to 100 GHz sending rate [5, 6] . With this in mind, the protocols presented here sit within the field of continuous-variable (CV) quantum cryptography, which aims towards fast sending rates over metropolitan distances. The four individual protocols each provide asymptotic security against a dishonest player performing a collective beamsplitter or entangling-cloner attack. Descriptions of each protocol and key details in their security proofs are sketched below, while the reader is referred to the appendices for technical details. e.g. 1) @A: "send n coherent states from A to users B, C" 2) @B, C: "perform n homodyne measurements of X, P" 3) ...
Agile Middleware
issue hardware-specific instructions e.g. 1) @A: "apply modulation voltage U" 2) @B, C: "read detector output" 3) ... Quantum crypto-agility can be realized by the introduction of a middleware acting as an interface between the user application (yellow) and quantum hardware (purple) layers. This requires that the hardware exposes a set of standardized capabilities or functions to the layers above. The middleware would then manage the selection of suitable quantum cryptographic primitives and hardware-compatible protocols to fulfill a given user request for cryptographic tasks. In this manner, the agile middleware generalizes and extends the functions of a key management system (KMS). For some of the acronyms occurring in this figure, please refer to the caption of The sender (Tx) and and receiver (Rx) modules may be reconfigured to make Alice either the sender ("f -configuration") or receiver ("b-configuration") of quantum states. Each setup may be considered agile, since once either the f -or b-configuration is chosen, multiple different cryptographic tasks may be performed.
A. First agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK
The first agile system we consider relies on the bconfiguration, with Bob and Charlie as the senders (Tx) of quantum states, while Alice performs heterodyne detection (Rx), Fig. 3 . This QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK system is capable of performing both QDS and QSS tasks via the protocols QDS-b and QSS-b, which are described below. Our experiment, detailed in Section IV, marks the first demonstration of CV QDS over insecure quantum channels.
The QDS-b protocol
The very first QDS scheme was proposed in Ref. [7] and required a quantum memory. In the last two decades, discrete-variable (DV) QDS protocols have first lifted this requirement [8] [9] [10] [11] and then also have lifted the need for a trusted quantum channel [2, 12] , and have brought their hardware requirements closer to those of QKD [13] . Recently, DV QDS implementations based on deployed networks have been demonstrated successfully over metropolitan distances [14] [15] [16] [17] . Indeed, in several QDS papers, a nascent form of quantum agility is mentioned, either explicity [14, 16, 18] or implicitly [15, 17] , but so far the comparison has always been that the distribution of quantum states for QDS is analogous-or in some cases identical-to that required for QKD. For example, Ref. [14] differs from differential-phase-shift QKD only in post-processing. Similarly, one protocol in Ref. [13] is designed specifically to share sender and receiver with QKD, while another requires first full QKD and then classical communication to sign a message. Despite these recognitions, to our knowledge the full utility of applying the idea of quantum crypto-agility to a deployed quantum network has not yet been explored, nor have additional cryptographic protocols been studied in this framework.
Unlike those preceding QDS protocols, in which Alice was the sender of quantum states, in QDS-b Bob and Charlie are the senders of quantum states, while Alice is the recipient, Fig. 3 (b) . This allows QDS-b to be performed on our first agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK.
The protocol QDS-b runs as follows: 1) For each future message m ∈ {0, 1}, which Alice wishes to securely sign, Bob and Charlie both send Alice a sequence, length L, of coherent states chosen randomly from the QPSK alphabet. Bob and Charlie each keep a record of which states they have sent. 2) Alice performs heterodyne detection on each received state, and forms eliminated signatures A m B,C by writing down which two states from QPSK are least compatible with her measurement outcome, that is, which states have the smallest conditional probability of being sent.
3) Bob and Charlie swap a random half of their signature elements in order to guard against dishonest Alice. Bob (Charlie) now possesses signatures X m B , (X m C ), which consists of two halves of length L/2, one of which was generated by Bob (Charlie), and one of which was received during the swapping. 4) Later, Alice sends her message m and the corresponding A m B,C , first to Bob. Bob compares his record of which states were sent, and counts the number of mismatches. A mismatch occurs if Alice claims to have eliminated a state which Bob indeed did send. Provided that there are sufficiently few mismatches, he accepts m as genuine and forwards to Charlie, who likewise accepts or rejects by counting the number of mismatches.
A QDS scheme must be secure against both forging attacks, in which a dishonest Bob will attempt to convince Charlie that a message is genuine; and repudiation attacks, in which a dishonest Alice will attempt to force Bob and Charlie to disagree about the message's validity. Furthermore, noting that a QDS protocol which declares all possible signatures as fake may be considered trivially secure, we require that the protocol should succeed if all parties are honest, that is, it should be robust.
The full security proof of QDS-b may be found in Appendix A. Here we simply note that security against forgery is guaranteed by picking a highly non-orthogonal alphabet of coherent states, i.e. the amplitude of the QPSK alphabet should be sufficiently small.
The main security result for QDS-b is the following expression for the binary entropy h
of a forging Bob's probability p e to induce a mismatch with Charlie. The χ denotes Bob's Holevo information about Charlie's distributed state. Then the final signature length L required to sign a 1 bit message with ε f ail probability of failure is implicitly given by [19, 20] 
provided that security parameter p e − p err > 0, where p err is an honest player's mismatch probability, which can be estimated during the protocol. In other words, QDS-b is secure against any attack provided that a dishonest player causes more mismatches than an honest player.
The protocol QDS-b performs well over channels with low loss and low excess noise, but in order to reach feasible signature lengths over realistic channels we will employ the postselection technique [21] . To our knowledge this is the first time this technique has been leveraged in the context of QDS. Alice will discard measurement outcomes for which she has a large probability of mismatch, thereby reducing p err . Since a forger will attack the sender (Tx) of quantum states rather than Alice, the probability p e is unaffected by postselection. The security parameter p e − p err may then be readily altered simply by choice of postselection region. The full postselection calculation is found in Appendix B.
The experimental implementation of the protocol is presented in Sec. IV, and the signature length L required to sign a 1 bit message to ε f ail chance of failure is given in Sec. V.
The QSS-b protocol
A secret-sharing scheme allows for Alice to distribute a classical secret between recipients Bob and Charlie. Bob and Charlie should be able to perfectly reconstruct the secret when they behave honestly, while either Bob or Charlie working alone should gain no information.
Although some existing classical secret-sharing schemes are already information-theoretically secure [22] , they encounter problems when distributing the shares of the secret across insecure channels, and may fall prey to an eavesdropper with a sufficiently powerful quantum computer. A potential solution is to employ a quantum secret sharing (QSS) protocol which uses quantum resources in order to share the classical secret [23, 24] . For example, the scheme put forward in Ref. [23] relies on large multipartite entangled states for distillation of keys between the dealer, Alice, and a degree of freedom shared between recipients. In another protocol [24] security is reached via a "round-robin" distribution stage with each player interacting with the same transmitted quantum state.
Crucially, unlike these approaches which require dedicated hardware setups or distribution of large entangled states, the QSS-b protocol presented here accomplishes the secret-sharing task using only distribution of QPSK coherent states and heterodyne detection, and thus forms an integral part of our first agile system QDS-b-QSSb-CV-QPSK, Fig. 3 . We additionally demonstrate in Sec. V, that QSS-b attains a larger key rate than an informational-theoretically secure classical secret sharing scheme performed over pairwise QKD-encrypted channels.
In the QSS-b protocol, the dealer (Alice) is assumed honest, while either one of the Bob or Charlie may be dishonest. Additionally, a dishonest fourth player, Eve, may be present. For now we assume that a dishonest Bob/Charlie will send states only from the QPSK alphabet, though this could be relaxed in future work.
The protocol QSS-b runs as follows: 1) Bob and Charlie send sequences of coherent states to Alice, which are independently and randomly chosen from the QPSK alphabet. Alice performs heterodyne measurement of phase and records her outcomes A B , A C ∈ C. Bob and Charlie keep a record, X B , X C , of which states they have sent.
2) Alice forms a variable X A F (A B , A C ) which is some function F of her measurement results. She then encodes the secret using the X A , and makes the encoded secret publicly available. 3) Later, when Alice wishes to allow Bob and Charlie to reconstruct the secret, she leaks the function F and enough information to perform a reconciliation procedure between her X A and the X A F (X B , X C ) generated by Bob and Charlie. The reconciliation proceeds as in regular QKD. 4) Bob and Charlie, by working together to form and reconcile F (X B , X C ), gain a copy of Alice's key. Thus they are able to decrypt her message.
The protocol should prevent dishonest players from reconstructing the secret unless they collaborate with the honest player. Specifically, they are forced to collaborate by Alice's choice of F which requires information from both players to reach the key. The function F can be arbitrarily chosen and optimized over, though for concreteness in the remainder of this work we will assume that F is linear.
The security proof for QSS-b is found in Appendix C. The main security result is a calculation of the key rate κ generated between Alice and a Bob-Charlie collaboration. The key rate corresponds to the number of secure key bits which which may be encrypted per channel use, i.e. after both Bob and Charlie have sent a state. One channel use thus corresponds to distribution of two coherent states.
In the the presence of dishonest Eve and honest Bob/Charlie the key rate κ is given by the following Devetak-Winter bound [23, 25] κ ≥ I (X B , X C :
relating the mutual information I between Bob/Charlie's classical information X B,C and Alice's information X A , and the Holevo information χ which Eve's quantum system E holds about X A .
More general bounds to guard against dishonest Bob/Charlie are given in the Appendix. The QSS-b protocol is implemented in Sec. IV, and the key rate to allow for secure secret-sharing is given in Sec. V.
B. Second agile system QDS-f -QKD-f -CV-QPSK
In addition to our first agile system described above, which is capable of readily switching between QDS and QSS tasks, we will demonstrate that cryptographic protocols which already exist in the literature may be viewed through an agile lens. We therefore turn to consider a second agile system, denoted QDS-f -QKD-f -CV-QPSK, which is capable of performing either QDS or QKD tasks in a "forward"-configuration, Fig. 3 .
A QDS protocol in which Alice sends quantum coherent states was previously considered in Ref. [19] . There, it is Bob and Charlie who form eliminated signatures, and check for mismatches between their eliminated signatures and Alice's declaration of which states she sent. We here denote this protocol QDS-f .
To go beyond [19] we apply the postselection technique to QDS-f , which decreases the number of quantum states L required to sign a message, particularly in the presence of channel noise. Since (in contrast to QDS-b) it is now Bob and Charlie who heterodyne, rather than Alice, both terms p e and p err now change with the choice of postselection region. The effects of postselection on QDS-f , and key steps from the security proof, are detailed in Appendix B.
Finally, we round-off the second agile system by noting that the discrete-modulation QPSK QKD protocol, analysed e.g. in Ref. [26] , may be readily implemented using the same hardware setup as QDS-f without requiring reconfiguration. This protocol, which we here denote QKD-f , may be performed between either Alice-Bob or Alice-Charlie. The full security proof is found in Ref. [26] , and we display the estimated maximum rate of secure key generation for our system under QKD-f in Section V.
IV. EXPERIMENT
Two optical sender (Tx) and receiver (Rx) hardware modules as shown in Fig. 4 by a Keysight M8195A arbitrary waveform generator (AWG), the sender randomly prepares pulses of coherent states chosen from the QPSK alphabet {|±α 0 , |±iα 0 }. These states are attenuated to a chosen output amplitude α < α 0 with a variable optical attenuator and sent to the receiver.
Receiver module (Rx):
The receiver module interferes the incoming signal with a local oscillator in an integrated Kylia COH24-X 90 • hybrid and performs heterodyne detection of the electric field quadratures X and P for each state using two Discovery DSC-R412 balanced optical receivers with an analog 3 dB-bandwidth of 20 GHz. For the purposes of this demonstration, the local oscillator is sourced from the carrier laser and transmitted to the receiver using an additional fiber. The optical receiver outputs are digitized and processed on a Tektronix DPO77002SX digital sampling oscilloscope using a sampling rate of 25 GS/s. Digital signal processing (DSP) is applied to the quadrature time traces, consisting of a high-pass filtering operation to eliminate lowfrequency noise components and a phase recovery step using reference states.
The experiment was realized by connecting Tx and Rx using standard single mode fiber spools with two different lengths: 2 km or 20 km, corresponding to −0.65 dB and −4.75 dB loss, respectively. Experiments were performed for different modulation amplitudes α, as indicated in Tab. I. For each state exchange, a total of 1.92 × 10 6 states were sent in frames of 64, with 4 bright phase reference states at the start of each frame. Of those, 1.54 × 10 6 states or 80.2 % remained after the DSP. A phase space diagram of the quantum state constellation and a section of the measured raw data can be seen in Fig. 5 . 
V. RESULTS
The agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK has been investigated over the 2 km fiber link with averageᾱ = 0.64 and an excess noise in the channel of 2.7 % in the laboratory conditions that represent the first targeted implementation of an agile quantum communication system. We obtain practical figures of merit for each of the protocols (5.7 ms to sign a 1-bit message for QDS-b and 2κ = 0.3726 key rate for QSS-b), listed in Tab. I. The protocol QSS-b has also been investigated in several 20 km experimental runs for different α and different levels of excess noise with key rate up to 2κ = 0.1058, completing the first demonstration of our practical CV QSS, Fig. 6 The second agile system QDS-f -QKD-f -CV-QPSK has been investigated over a 2 km laboratory fiber link and in several runs over 20 km for different α and different levels of excess noise in order to explore performance at larger distances, which are less favorable for CV communication systems. Alongside the agility aspects, this experiment has demonstrated the fastest to-date QDS system at intra-city distances, allowing to sign a 1-bit message in less than 0.05 ms over a 2 km fiber link. It has also allowed for a secure performance of the agile system at 20 km distance with feasible signature lengths, Fig. 7 , with signing times close to the recent best DV experiments, Fig. 8 , and with maximum calculated key rates κ = 0.1024 for QKD-f . We detail and benchmark the different aspects of the experimental performance of the two agile systems in what follows. The key rate is robust to variations in α, and remains large even for our 20 km channel. Solid (red), dashed (blue), dotdashed (orange) and dotted (green) lines correspond to the performance deduced by parameters from experimental runs 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Vertical grid lines depict loss levels over experimental channels A and B, corresponding to fiber lengths 2 km (0.65 dB loss) and 20 km (4.75 dB loss). QDS signature lengths (L) and signing times (t) required to sign a 1-bit message for security level of ε = 0.01%. The QSS and QKD key rates correspond to the maximum estimated number of bits of secure key which may be generated per use of the quantum channel. In QSS-b, one channel use corresponds to distribution of two quantum states, one from Bob and one from Charlie, and so we display 2κ for fair comparison with QKD.
A. Settings for the system runs
We performed the experiment detailed above over two different channels which we denote channel A and channel B, corresponding to 2 km fiber length and 20 km fiber length, respectively. During the experiment, measurement outcomes corresponding to parameters detailed in Tab. I were obtained. Each element of the QPSK alphabet had slightly different sending amplitude in each experiment, and we display the average amplitudeᾱ in the table. The excess noise ξ above the shot-noise was calculated for each quadrature x, p and ξ = max{ξ x , ξ p } was taken as a worst-case scenario. We now process our measured data with reference to each of the four quantum protocols and thus demonstrate quantum crypto-agility of our two systems.
B. First agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK
In the first agile system QDS-b-QSS-b-CV-QPSK, the sender module Tx is understood to play the role of either Bob or Charlie, while Rx plays the role of Alice. Signature lengths are calculated using data parameters from Tab. I with the postselection region R (∆ r ) optimized at each channel loss, see Appendix. B. In the ideal case, the probability p err is calculated using Eq. (B3) under the model described in Appendix B, which includes both channel excess noise ξ, ascribed to Eve, and a detector efficiency of 50% which Eve cannot exploit. We allow Eve to perform the entangling cloner attack [19] which is expected to be optimal in the limit α → 0, and close to optimal for the small α's used here, and probability p e may be estimated as in Appendix A once the worstcase α and ξ have been estimated from data. The ideal signature lengths for QDS-b are displayed in Fig. 6 .
More realistic signature lengths may be calculated by taking into account in the estimate of p e the actual amplitudes and sending probabilities which Tx sent, rather than an average, and by measuring p err directly from the output of Rx. The p err calculated this way takes into account all sources of detector loss and trusted noise which will increase p err , and thus the measured L will be larger than those in Fig. 6 .
For experimental run 1 over the 2 km channel under entangling-cloner attack, signature length L = 5.7 × 10 6 is required to sign a single bit, Tab. I. However, even at 20 km, QDS-b could still be made secure by choosing a large postselection region with ∆ r 1, but for loss levels more than ∼ 2 dB the signature length required becomes impractically large.
For our secret-sharing protocol QSS-b, Fig. 6 , the Holevo information is calculated by estimating channel transmission T and excess noise ξ from the data and assuming the dishonest players perform a beamsplitter attack. The mutual information is calculated by calculating the probability p (x|α k ) of measuring x ∈ C at the output when coherent state α k was sent, noting again that the realistic non-identical amplitudes and probabilities of the implemented QPSK alphabet may be readily included. Further details are found in Appendix C. Maximum QSS key rates, calculated from measured experimental parameters, are displayed in Tab. I, where we see that twice the key rate, 2κ is greater than the comparable key rate κ for QKD-f (remembering that one channel use is defined differently between QKD and QSS). In other words, QSS-b outperforms pairwise QKD, by consuming fewer quantum resources. Protocol QSS-b is therefore preferable over a classical information-theoretically secure protocol performed over pairwise QKD-encrypted channels.
C. Second Agile system QDS-f -QKD-f -CV-QPSK
For the second agile system, QDS-f -QKD-f -CV-QPSK, Tx plays the role of Alice while Rx plays either Bob or Charlie. The performance of protocol QDS-f is displayed in Fig. 7 under a beamsplitter attack. The excess noise and detector efficiency from experiment are included, and p e and p err are calculated via analogous methods to QDS-b, above. We see that in the ideal analysis of Fig. 7 , protocol QDS-f allows for very small signature lengths O 10 4 at 2 km, while at 20 km the pre- dicted lengths are still very modest at O 10 6 .
For small channel loss the required L is roughly invariant over a broad range of α, which suggests that QDS-f is robust to experimental differences, and is thus easy to implement on an agile system alongside future alternative cryptographic protocols which may require more restrictive choice of α. For large channel loss however the choice of α becomes increasingly important, but using for example the meanᾱ = 0.55 and ξ = 2.1% from experimental run 3, QDS-f is predicted to remain secure even down to 20 dB loss with still-feasible signature lengths O 10 9 , which would allow a one-bit message to be signed in approximately one second.
A more realistic signature length may be calculated by using the p err directly measured from the output of Rx, which includes all noise sources and detector inefficiencies. This results in the signature lengths which are displayed in Tab. I. Crucially, they remain highly feasible over the metropolitan distances where continuousvariable cryptography is expected to be effective. Of particular note is the L = 47, 887 required to securely sign a 1 bit message over 2 km fiber, which to our knowledge makes QDS-f the fastest ever demonstration of a QDS protocol, requiring just 0.047 ms to sign a message at our 1 GHz sending rate, Fig. 8 .
The calculated maximum secure key rates under protocol QKD-f are plotted in Fig. 7 under a beamplitter attack. The performance of the protocol agrees with Ref. [26] over comparable parameter regimes, while the QPSK amplitudes employed in our experiment are close to optimal. Calculated maximum key rates, deduced from experimental parameters, are displayed in Tab. I.
Finally, we want to note that key rates in a concrete implementation will depend on a number of parameters. For example, error correction in CV QKD can be computationally very demanding and will limit the obtainable key rate. In an agile system, therefore, one should resort to the protocol with the least demand on resources for a given task.
VI. CONCLUSION
Agile quantum cryptography allows the introduction of a layer abstraction between the quantum optical hardware and the protocol layer based on firmware and software. To underpin this concept, we have experimentally demonstrated that the same quantum sender and receiver can be utilized independent of the protocol run on top of it. This allows future quantum cryptography systems to be optimized towards agility and to explore how this concept can be applied to already existing ones. The proposed layer abstraction could potentially be further developed through standardization groups.
For the demonstrations we have utilized a continuousvariable quantum communication system that is almost exclusively built from commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) telecom components. This makes it inherently compatible with telecom networks and allows C-band operation and high sending rates, since telecom components for coherent communication are optimized for GHz sending rates, even ranging up to 100 GHz as the state of the art. This setup has been operated at a sending rate of 1 GHz, however there is no known fundamental limit to these rates. The current limitation is the electronic noise of the coherent detection unit, which can be further optimized in future works.
The continuous-variable protocols investigated were quantum digital signatures (QDS), quantum secret shar- [20] . (b) Unambiguous-state-elimination-based QDS [27] . (c) Differential-phase-shift-based QDS [14] . (d) GHz BB84 QDS [17] . (e) Early QDS-QKD "agile" system with measurementdevice-independent capabilities [18] .
ing (QSS) and quantum key distribution (QKD). We have shown for the first time that postselection can be utilized for QDS and have proven its enhanced robustness to noise and to channel loss. Postselection on QDS measurement outcomes decreases the required signature lengths and thus allows us to demonstrate the shortest signing time for realistic distances of 2 km and signing times comparable to recent discrete-variable QDS protocols over 20 km. Furthermore the security of the QDS protocols has been proven for forward and backward sending configurations, enabling them to be used in both of the agile systems presented in this paper.
Recall that a QDS protocol must be secure against repudiation and forgery, and it should be robust and succeed if all players are honest. We will prove the security of our protocol against each of these, and finally derive Eq. (2), which implicitly defines the main figure of merit of a QDS protocol, the signature length L required to sign a 1 bit message.
During a repudiation attack, Alice will try to cause Bob and Charlie to disagree about whether her message is genuine. Security against repudiation follows along similar lines to [19, 20, 27] , and we reproduce key details below for completeness.
We assume that Alice is free to manipulate her declared A m B,C , and she has full control over the mismatch rates p B (p C ) with respect to states which she originally sent to Bob or Charlie, and the p B,C may even be chosen to be zero.
After swapping, step three of the protocol, Bob and Charlie both possess two half-signatures, each of length L/2, consisting either of states which they held originally or which they received during swapping. Alice succeeds in her repudiation attack if Bob accepts both of his halves as genuine, and Charlie rejects at least one of his halves as fake. Therefore the probability of successful repudiation is given by
where A (B) denotes the event that Bob accepts on his first (second) half, and C (D) denotes the event that Charlie rejects on his first (second) half. Now, using probability inequalities P (X ∩ Y ) ≤ min {P (X) , P (Y )} and P (X ∪ Y ) ≤ P (X) + P (Y ) and Hoeffding's inequalities [28] , we
Therefore we arrive at
provided that s B < s C , and where in the second inequality we have taken p = (s B + s C ) /2 in order to maximize ε rep . A QDS protocol is robust if it succeeds when all parties are honest. Even in this case there is a probability p err of mismatch, owing to the non-orthogonality of the QPSK alphabet. Since s B < s C , an honest message is more likely to be rejected by Bob than Charlie, so we bound this probability. The message will be rejected if Bob detects more than s B L/2 mismatches on either half of his eliminated signature. Using Hoeffding's inequalities this occurs with probability
provided that s B > p err , i.e. Bob's mismatch threshold is greater than the honest mismatch rate. In a forging attack, an eavesdropper will aim to minimize their mismatch probability with respect to either of the X m B,C generated by Bob and Charlie. Since Bob already knows half of X m C (the information which Bob himself forwarded), and since s B < s C , the most dangerous forger is a dishonest Bob. He is therefore assumed to eavesdrop on Charlie's distribution of quantum states, and tries to gain information about the L/2 signature elements which Charlie generated himself.
Using Hoeffding's inequalities as in Ref. [19] we see that a forging attack succeeds with probability
when p e > s C , and therefore all that is required is to bound p e , which we now do. Consider the j th signature element. Charlie holds some c j denoting which state from the QPSK alphabet he sent. Bob will declare an eliminated signature element,
Finally, we note that under a beamsplitter attack, Eve's a priori state is
when states |α k from the QPSK alphabet are sent through lossy channel with transmittivity T. Eve's a posteriori state is simply
, from which her Holevo information is calculated as
with S the Von Neuman entropy.
Appendix B: Postselection in CV QDS
In the QKD context it has been known for some time that postselection will improve key rates in the presence of excess noise, and is even a requirement for distilling a key for T < 1/2 in the direct-reconciliation regime [21] . We are thus motivated to apply postselection to protocol QDS-b in order to allow a message to be securely signed over a larger range of channel parameters.
To apply the postselection technique, recipients in the protocol will simply disregard unfavourable measurement outcomes, i.e. outcomes for which a dishonest player is deemed to have too much knowledge, or for which the probability of honest mismatch is too high. We thus define a region R of phase-space, and only allow honest players to accept measurement outcomes x / ∈ R. The region R is then varied to increase the range of channel parameters for which the QDS protocols are secure, and to minimize signature length L.
To be concrete, in this work we take R parameterized by ∆ r , ∆ θ in polar coordinates in phase-space. This is the same postselection region considered in the recent QKD work Ref. [30] , but if desired, more general regions may be readily considered.
We will now consider how this application of postselection affects security of QDS-b and QDS-f .
QDS-b
The crucial quantity which controls the security of a QDS protocol is g sec := p e − p err , which intuitively describes how much worse a dishonest player should fare than an honest player. The protocol is secure provided that g sec > 0. We therefore must consider how postselection affects g sec .
In QDS-b, p e does not depend on Alice's heterodyne measurement, since a dishonest player will attack the sender (Tx) of the quantum states, and so p e is unaffected by postselection. We thus calculate the transformation of p err .
Although in an actual run of the protocol the honest mismatch rate p err should be estimated from a publicly disclosed subset of A m B,C and X m B,C , it is illustrative to consider how p err may be calculated theoretically. When Charlie sends state |α k through a lossy channel, transmittivity T, then Alice receives outcome x ∈ C with probability 
with f (r, θ) = p re iθ |α and N the probability that the outcome x ∈ C is accepted, i.e. it falls within C\R. Probability N is calculated analogously to Eq. (B3). The above analysis follows identically when excess noise is included, using the requisite formulas from [19, 26] . Finally, we note that when postselection is used the signature length L calculated from Eq. (2) should be rescaled in order to remain a useful figure of merit. While the normally calculated L counts how many signature elements are required to sign the message, many of the states which were sent during the protocol will be rejected. Including these in our accounting, the figure of merit is rescaled L →L := L/N . These L andL may now be directly compared between protocols, and thus in Sec. V we make no distinction between L andL.
QDS-f
Probability p err varies identically to QDS-b when postselection is included, but now since a dishonest player's declaration depends on an honest player's heterodyne outcome, the probability p e must also vary with R. We recall that the key security result for QDS-f , taking dishonest Bob as the forger, is [19] h (p e ) ≥ 1 − χ (B4)
with χ the Holevo information between Bob's quantum system and Charlie's eliminated signature element. For the j th signature element in QDS-f this takes the form
The a posteriori state ρ
is the quantum state held by Bob when Charlie's eliminated signature element is x j 1 , x j 2 , and ρ j B is Bob's a priori state which is mixed over all eliminated signature elements.
Under the beamsplitter or entangling-cloner attacks considered in this work, the conditional state ρ j B|c held by Bob after Charlie measures c ∈ C may be readily calculated as in [19] . Then, since Charlie's eliminated signature element is entirely determined by the quadrant in which c lies, the state ρ where N is the required normalization factor, and where in the second line we have explicitly shown the calculation for a particular eliminated signature element.
Then we see that when postselection over region R (∆ r , ∆ θ ) is used, Eq. (B6) should be modified with N the same normalization factor as in Eq. (B3). The a priori state is likewise found by mixing Eq. (B7) over all quadrants, and thus p e may be calculated. The figure of merit for QDS-f under postselection is nowL, as in the preceding section, though since this may be directly compared with L in the absence of postselection we make no distinction in the main body of the paper. All results presented have the optimal choice of R (∆ r ), noting that variations in ∆ θ provide only small changes to signature lengths in both QDS-b and QDS-f , and so in the main body of the paper we set ∆ θ = 0 in order to focus on the much larger effects of the radial variations.
